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Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of the business cycle in fertility, using 
data from 30 European countries for the period 1991 to 2013. We find that the 
unemployment rate, utilized as a proxy for the evolution of the business cycle, 
negatively affects the fertility rate, at least in the short term. This is maintained 
even when we control for the welfare generosity of the European countries, and 
for other socio-economic variables and unobservable characteristics that can 
vary by country and/or over time. Our results suggest that fertility decisions 
behave in a pro-cyclical way, although the effect of the business cycle variations 
is quite moderate. By age of women, we observe differences in the response of 
the fertility rate, with the impact of economic problems being lower for those 
who are at the end of their childbearing years. Supplementary analysis, 
developed to explore the impact of the business cycle on the entire distribution 
of the fertility rate, indicates that the effect of the unemployment rate varies 
considerably, having a strong effect on the fertility rate at higher quantiles, 
corresponding with higher fertility rates. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, Europe has endured a severe economic crisis, although this is not the 
only current European crisis.1 In the late 1990s through the early 2000s, the fertility 
rates of most European countries fell dramatically, dropping to the lowest levels of 
fertility of the 20th century (Kohler et al. 2002). That was followed by a decade of 
increasing fertility rates (Source: Eurostat), which could have indicated that Europe had 
accomplished a reversion of the decreasing trend observed since the 1960s, rising above 
the once-worrying levels of low fertility (Goldstein et al. 2009). However, within a few 
years, and coinciding with the economic crisis, the fertility rate again experienced a 
sharp decline that threatened a generational change. Low levels of fertility may entail 
demographic, economic, and social consequences, such as an aging population, and 
even a decline in the total population (Bloom et al. 2010), both of which are of serious 
concern to politicians and researchers. Prior research on fertility issues encompassed a 
broad range of topics, searching for the determinants of its evolution (see, for a review, 
Feyrer et al. 2008): the decline in child mortality (Doepke 2005), the reforms affecting 
the legality of abortion and the contraceptive pill (Ananat et al. 2007; Goldin and Katz 
2000; 2002), the increasing incorporation of women into the labor market (Ahn and 
Mira 2002), and the changes in divorce laws introduced across European countries 
(Bellido and Marcén 2014). In this paper, we explore whether the business cycle plays a 
role in determining the evolution of fertility rates, within a framework of low levels of 
fertility coupled with the generous welfare systems of Europe. 
We are not the first to analyze the impact of the business cycle on fertility (see, for 
a review, Sobotka et al. 2011), but the bulk of the existing literature focuses on the 
United States (Ananat et al. 2013; Butz and Ward 1979; Cherlin et al. 2013; Mocan 
1990; Ogburn and Thomas 1922; Rindfuss et al. 1988; Schneider 2015; Schneider and 
Hastings 2015). The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed, with some papers 
showing a negative relationship between business cycle fluctuations and the fertility rate 
(Rindfuss el al. 1988), while others find a positive association (Butz and Ward 1979). 
More recently, research has concentrated on the effect of the last Great Recession on 
fertility in the US. In this case, the evidence appears to point to a negative relationship 
between the economic crisis and fertility (Ananat et al. 2013; Cherlin et al. 2013; 
                                                 
1 “Europe’s other crisis” Recession is bringing Europe’s brief fertility rally to a shuddering halt, The 
Economist, Jun 30th 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21557774 
Schneider 2015; Schneider and Hastings 2015). There are also studies of other 
countries, such as the work of Adsera and Menendez (2011), who find that childbearing 
follows a pro-cyclical pattern of behavior in Latin America, decreasing during economic 
downturns. Kravdal (2002), studying the case of Norway, concludes that unemployment 
has a negative but moderate impact on fertility, while Andersson (2000) determines that 
fertility experiences a pro-cyclical evolution in the case of Sweden. We contribute to the 
literature by exploring the issue for a panel of 30 European countries.  
The impact of business cycle changes on fertility, from a theoretical point of view, 
is not clear. On the one hand, during an economic crisis, the economic constraints 
increase, making the costs of having a child more difficult to afford (Morgan et al., 
2011). Thus, we would expect a pro-cyclical response of the fertility rate to the business 
cycle fluctuations that is consistent with a framework where income effects are 
dominant during economic hard times. In the case of Europe, this approach could be 
less relevant than in other parts of the world, such as the US, due to the greater 
generosity of the welfare systems of most European countries (Alesina et al. 2001), 
which can reduce the effects of economic downturns. On the other hand, since the 
average age at which women have their first child is relatively advanced in the case of 
European women (Sobotka 2004), the postponement of fertility decisions is less 
possible in an economic crisis because of the limitation imposed by the approaching end 
of their childbearing years (the so-called biological clock). So, in this case, no effect of 
the economic downturns (or much more moderate negative impact) on fertility would be 
expected, compared to countries where women have their children earlier in life. 
Additionally, for women, who are normally the main caretakers, children would be less 
expensive to rear during economic recessions because the opportunity costs are lower in 
those periods, encouraging fertility (Butz and Ward 1979). If this were the dominant 
behavior, the fertility response would be counter-cyclical. Then, from this theoretical 
overview, it is not possible to determine an a priori clear relationship between business 
cycle variations and fertility, with this being even more the case in Europe, so an 
empirical analysis is needed to analyze which one of these perspectives dominates. 
To examine this issue, we utilize European data on the General Fertility Rate (GFR) 
from 1991 to 2013, measured at the country level, which covers the most acute and 
recent European economic crisis (data from Eurostat). The GFR is calculated as the 
number of live births within a country in a year, divided by the number of women aged 
15 to 44 residing in the country in the same year, and multiplied by 1,000. In order to 
measure the business cycle, we use information on the national unemployment rate in 
the countries included in our research during the same period. Although, as described 
above, theoretically, the relationship between the business cycle and fertility is unclear, 
our results suggest that unemployment and fertility are negatively associated, but that 
the effect is quite moderate, which is similar to that observed, for example, using US 
data (Schneider 2015). An increase of one percentage-point in the unemployment rate 
involves only 0.346 fewer live births per thousand women aged 15 to 44.  This result is 
maintained even after including controls for unobservable characteristics that can vary 
at the country level and/or over time. Our findings do not vary when we incorporate 
controls for observable characteristics measured at the country level that may affect 
fertility decisions, such as family policies (Gauthier 2007), female education (Leon 
2004), religion (McQuillan 2004), infant mortality (Sah 1991), and marital differences 
(Breierova and Duflo 2004). Our findings are also unchanged when we utilize different 
sub-samples considering the political, institutional, and economic changes occurring in 
some of the countries included in our analysis.  
The analysis is also run after taking into account possible differences in the 
response to the business cycle fluctuations by age of the mother. As mentioned above, 
the average age at which women have their first child is quite high in the case of most 
European countries (Sobotka 2004). This fact makes the postponement of a fertility 
decision quite difficult in an unemployment situation or in a situation of economic 
uncertainty. Additionally, economic constraints cannot be the same in the early stages 
of women’s lives than when they are older. Regardless of the age of women, all our 
results point to a pro-cyclical response of fertility to business cycle fluctuations in 
Europe during the last decades of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st 
century, but the differences by age of mother are remarkable. What is clearly detected is 
that, for those women towards the end of their childbearing years, the unemployment 
rate has a low impact. However, in the early years of fertility, there are differences by 
age. This is also observed when the youth unemployment rate is utilized as a measure of 
the economic constraints on young women. 
In the short-term, even when women are close to the end of their childbearing 
years, couples may react to changes in labor market conditions by putting off their 
fertility decisions. In these circumstances, there can be a lag in the impact of the 
unemployment rate on fertility. For this reason, we include in our study lagged 
unemployment rates. We consider lags from 1 to 2 years, although the duration of the 
lag is not clear (as we discuss below). We find evidence pointing to an effect of the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate, and of the unemployment rate lagged one year on 
the fertility rate.  
 We also contribute to the existing literature by exploring the possible non-linear 
response of fertility decisions to variations in the business cycle. We examine the 
impact of the business cycle on the entire distribution of the fertility rate, not merely its 
conditional mean, by using quantile regressions. We consider that this is necessary since 
part of the variation in fertility rates may reflect the fact that the influence of certain 
country characteristics, particularly the unemployment rate, is not uniform across the 
distribution of the variable. The response of women to changes in economic 
circumstances may not be the same in a framework of higher fertility rates, where each 
woman is more likely to have more than one child, than in a framework where women 
are more likely to have just one child. Results suggest that the effect of the 
unemployment rate is much more moderate at lower quantiles, low fertility rates, than at 
higher quantiles, high fertility rates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
used. In Section 3, we describe the methodology. Section 4 shows our main results. 
Section 5 presents the lag specifications. The non-linear analysis is conducted in Section 
6, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
The fertility data covers 30 European countries from 1991 to 2013. This information is 
publicly available from Eurostat.2 We consider in our main analysis the GFR, calculated 
as the number of live births within a country in a year, divided by the number of women 
                                                 
2 Our sample includes 27 European countries that were European Union (EU) members in 2013 (the 
accession of Croatia took place on 1st July 2013, so this country is not included in the analysis). We have 
also added 3 more countries to the analysis: Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Iceland and Norway were 
not EU members but were part, as the rest of EU countries, of the European Economic Area (EEA), 
which allowed them to be part of the EU’s single market. Switzerland was neither an EU nor an EEA 
member but was part of the single market. All nationals of those countries have the same rights to live 
and work in other EEA countries. Liechtenstein was also part of the European Economic Area, but it is 
not incorporated because of problems of availability of information.  
aged 15 to 44 residing in the country in the same year, multiplied by 1,000.3 This is a 
common measure of fertility that allows us to analyze the reaction of fertility decisions 
in the short term (Schneider 2015).4 This is not the only standard measure of fertility 
considered. We have also re-run all the analysis using other definitions of the fertility 
rate, such as the Crude Birth Rate (defined as the annual number of births per 100 
inhabitants) and the Total Fertility Rate (defined as the mean number of children that 
would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her 
childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates, by age, of a given year). Results do 
not vary and are available upon request. This is not surprising since these measures of 
fertility have a similar pattern to that of the GFR (Bellido and Marcén 2014). 
To measure business cycle variations, we utilize country-level unemployment rates 
obtained from the World Data Bank.5 Unemployment refers to the share of the labor 
force that is without work but is available for and seeking employment. The 
unemployment rate is calculated as the percentage of unemployed individuals in the 
labor force. This rate includes changes in both labor demand and labor supply. It is a 
common indicator of economic conditions, which picks up not only the effects of 
individual job losses, but also variations in economic uncertainty (Schaller 2013). It is 
useful in our analysis, since this aggregate variable is less likely to be endogenous to 
fertility decisions than other income or employment measures, such as own wages. Of 
course, we recognize that this variable presents some problems, since it can understate 
the magnitude of a recession by failing to incorporate discouraged workers, and because 
it can be a lagged indicator of economic recession. Nonetheless, the use of a lagged 
indicator of economic variations could be appropriate because our measure of fertility is 
also a lagged proxy of fertility decisions. The fertility decisions normally take place 
several months before childbirth; then, the unemployment rate can be a good indicator 
of the economic conditions when couples considered having a child. Despite its 
weaknesses, the unemployment rate is the best available proxy to pick up changes in 
labor market conditions (Schaller 2013). 
                                                 
3 Note that for the case of France, we use information for metropolitan France from Eurostat due to the 
scarcity of data available in that dataset for the whole of France in the period considered. Results do not 
vary substantially when we use the somewhat scarce information for the whole of France publicly 
available in Eurostat. Data for the year 2013 is obtained from the INSEE dataset in the case of 
metropolitan France. 
4 To study the long-term effects of the current economic crisis, we must wait some time in order to have 
the completed fertility rates of those women who can now still have children. 
5 All the analysis has been repeated using male and female unemployment rates. We revisit this issue 
below. 
Table 1presents the average GFR and unemployment rates for the sample period 
(1991 – 2013), for the 30 countries included in our analysis, ordered from high to low 
average unemployment rates. As can be seen, there are significant differences in the 
average unemployment and fertility rates across countries. Although it is quite difficult 
to discern a relationship between these two variables, the tails of the unemployment rate 
distributions show that, in those low-unemployment-rate countries, fertility rates are 
high, whereas those with relatively high unemployment rates show fertility rates that are 
quite low. For the countries with an unemployment rate 2 percentage points above and 
below the average rate for the whole of Europe (around 8%), no clear relationship can 
be established. Neither a geographical pattern nor a religion pattern can explain the 
differences in fertility and in the association between the unemployment rate and the 
fertility rate across countries.  
A quick glance at the temporal evolution of the average GFR for the whole of 
Europe, and that of the unemployment rate, does not reveal a clear relationship between 
unemployment changes and fertility variations, although some movements of those rates 
may indicate a possible pro-cyclical response of the fertility rate to the unemployment 
rate (see Figure 1). Our sample begins with a sharp decline in the average GFR, 
coinciding with a period of pronounced increases in the unemployment rate. After that, 
the drop in the unemployment rate until 1998 corresponds to a smooth decline in the 
fertility rate. Then, the unemployment rate stabilizes around 8% and the fertility rate, in 
a stable economic situation, begins to increase. The same movement of the fertility rate 
is detected when the unemployment rate falls from 2004 to 2007, but the rise in the 
fertility rate again stabilizes when the unemployment rate increases suddenly during the 
onset of the Great Recession of 2008 to 2009. Of course, this is not a conclusive 
analysis. In the following sections, we examine the possible relationship between 
fertility and unemployment more closely. 
 
3. Methodology 
In our main analysis, we estimate the following equation: 
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with itGFR  being the fertility rate of country i in year t and itUnemp  being the 
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of unobserved characteristics that vary over time. itε  is the error term.  
Following the methodology utilized in prior studies of the impact of the business 
cycle on socio-demographic variables (Marcén and González-Val 2015; Schaller 2013; 
Schneider 2015; among others), we use country-level unemployment variations to 
identify the relationship between unemployment and fertility rates, given that these 
variations are considered exogenous. As in prior works, there are some concerns on this 
issue. For example, women may decide to change their participation in the labor market 
after bearing a child, especially in the first years following childbirth, which will affect 
unemployment rates. We revisit this issue below, following the approach proposed by 
Schaller (2013). With respect to the expected impact of unemployment on fertility, as 
explained above, the effect, from a theoretical point of view, is not clear. The sign of the 
β  coefficient, which captures the reaction of fertility to unemployment, could be 
positive (counter-cyclical behavior) or negative (pro-cyclical behavior).  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
Table 2 reports the results for Eq. (1), with all of the regressions weighted by country 
population, and robust standard errors clustered by country. In Column (1), which does 
not include controls, a one-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate involves 
a decrease of the GFR of almost 0.534. This negative relationship is also seen when we 
add controls for country and year fixed effects, country-specific linear and quadratic 
time trends in Columns (2) and (3), although the magnitude of the effect decreases in 
absolute value to 0.346. This may occur because, in those specifications, we are not 
only removing country fixed characteristics, but also time-variant unobservable factors 
that could bias the results presented in Column (1) (as suggested by Schneider 2015). 
The response of the fertility rate to the unemployment rate appears to be moderate, 
given that the range of variation in the average unemployment rate in the period 
considered was only between 6% and 10%, whereas in the case of the GFR was 
between 50 and 60 live births per thousand women aged 15 to 44. In any case, an 
increase in the unemployment rate from 6% to around 10%, similar to that observed 
during the last Great Recession, would be associated with 1.384 fewer live births per 
thousand women aged 15 to 44, which almost corresponds with the variation in the 
average GFR since 2008. Our results are maintained when the GFR is measured in 
logarithm in Column (4).6  
One concern with these results arises from the possibility that the variations in the 
unemployment rates are driven by changes in the GFR, which could generate problems 
with the assumption of exogeneity. Since many women modify their participation in the 
labor market after giving birth (Bloom et al. 2009), if fewer women have children, then 
more women may be participating in the labor market. However, as Schaller (2013) 
claims, the relationship between variations in women’s participation in the labor market 
and changes in the overall unemployment rate is not clear. In any case, to tackle this 
issue, we repeat this analysis using the male unemployment rate as the variable of 
interest.7  We use this strategy, following Schaller (2013) and González-Val and Marcén 
(2015), because men are less likely to change their participation in the labor market due 
to fertility issues. As pointed out by the European Commission in its Female Labor 
Market Participation Report, having children may affect more the time devoted by 
women to the labor market, than the time devoted by men. Results are presented in 
Column (5) of Table 2. The association between male unemployment and the fertility 
rate remains negative and statistically significant, with the magnitude of the effect being 
quite similar to that observed when we use the overall unemployment rate. Even being 
aware of the problems of using the female unemployment rate, we have also 
incorporated in our main specification the female unemployment rate, rather than the 
overall unemployment rate. As can be seen in Column (6) of Table 2, results are 
unchanged. These finding suggest a pro-cyclical behavior of fertility, regardless of the 
measure of the unemployment rate considered. 
                                                 
6 For robustness purposes, we repeat all of the estimates with/without population weights, with/without 
women population weights, and with/without clustering the standard errors, and our results do not vary. 
In addition, we repeat all estimates removing each country one at a time and removing at the same time 
those countries with low and high fertility rates and unemployment rates, finding very similar results to 
those shown in Table 2. 
7 Results are quite similar whether we use the overall unemployment rate or the male unemployment rate. 
For this reason, in the rest of the analysis, we have only included as explanatory variable the overall 
unemployment rate. The rest of the estimates are available upon request. 
One can also argue that it is the unemployment rate of the young, rather than the 
overall unemployment rate, that really determines the evolution of fertility decisions. 
Women have limitations on having children, in that their childbearing years are time-
sensitive. In addition, young women get pregnant more easily and they are less likely to 
have problems during pregnancy. Thus, it is possible to surmise that it is the 
unemployment rate of their counterparts in the early stages of their life that matters in 
the decision to have a child or not. In fact, the last Great Recession has hit the young 
across Europe very hard, particularly in Southern Europe. For example, in the cases of 
France and Italy, one out of four of the young is unemployed, while the overall 
unemployment rate is much lower, and in Spain, this ratio greatly exceeds 40% 
(Scarpetta et al. 2010).  
To examine this issue, we study the relationship between the unemployment rate of 
young individuals and the fertility rate of women, with that rate defined by age of the 
women. We use as dependent variables the GFR by age of the mother (Source: 
Eurostat), from ages 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, and 40 to 44, calculated as 
the number of live births per thousand women in the same age interval. The youth 
unemployment rate includes young active people between 15 and 24 years old who 
want to work, and are actively seeking a job. Results are displayed in Figure 2. As in the 
case of the US (Schneider 2015), for Europe, we observe certain variations depending 
on the age of women, with the youth unemployment rate having a greater impact in the 
case of those aged 20 to 24. The low impact of unemployment in the case of those aged 
15 to 19 years old is not unexpected, since much of teen motherhood is unplanned 
and/or responds to cultural issues (Bellido et al. 2016), so it is less likely to be due to 
variations in the business cycle. For the other age groups, those women older than 24, 
we have run the analysis with the youth unemployment rate as well as with the overall 
unemployment rate. Note that both rates are highly correlated at the country level, with 
those countries having high unemployment rates also presenting high youth 
unemployment rates. As can be expected, the pattern of response of the fertility rates is 
quite similar to both measures of unemployment. What is surprising is the low 
estimated response, in absolute value, of the fertility rate of those aged 25 to 29, as even 
in the case of the overall unemployment rate, this coefficient is not statistically 
significant. One possible explanation for this particular age group is the fact that the 
average age at first birth in Europe is under 29 years old (Eurostat News Release 2015). 
Then, although young women under 25 years old may react to economic constraints by 
postponing childbirth, that decision cannot be deferred for many years, because of ‘the 
ticking of the biological clock’, regardless of the economic situation. This issue is even 
more important for those women who want to have several children, and their first child 
early in life. Thus, women can postpone their first child when they are young, but when 
they are between 25 to 29 they would be more likely to have their children for reasons 
unrelated to economic conditions. Educational issues can also play a role. We revisit 
this issue below. With respect to other age groups, it is clearly observed that the older 
the women, the lower the impact of unemployment, which is consistent with the notion 
of the approaching end of their childbearing years. In any case, even for older women, 
we find empirical evidence of some responsivity of fertility rates to economic changes. 
4.2. More Robustness Checks 
Children are usually considered as marriage-specific capital investments (Becker et 
al. 1977, and Stevenson 2007). This can be relevant in our analysis if, for example, 
those countries having high unemployment rates are those with low marriage rates and 
consequently fewer children. Then, one can argue that the differences in marriage rates 
are driving our results, rather than differences in unemployment rates. To explore this 
issue, we include in the analysis the crude marriage rate measured at the country level, 
and defined as the ratio of the number of marriages during the year to the average 
population in that year, and expressed per 1,000 inhabitants (Source: Eurostat). The 
estimated coefficients are presented in Column (1) of Table 3. In the case of the 
marriage rate, as expected, the higher the crude marriage rate, the greater the number of 
live births per thousand women aged 15 to 44. No effect is observed when the crude 
divorce rate (Source: Eurostat), incorporated as a measure of marital behavior at the 
country level, is added to the specification in Column (2). The coefficients picking up 
the relationship between unemployment and fertility are again negative and statistically 
significant, Columns (1) and (2), pointing to the pro-cyclical response of fertility to the 
business cycle. To capture the marital behavior of individuals in Europe, we also 
include as controls the average age at first marriage of both men and women (Source: 
Eurostat), since those women who marry earlier can have more children (Bumpass and 
Mburugu 1977), see Columns (3) and (4). As previously, if, for example, those 
countries having low unemployment rates are also those in which individuals marry 
earlier, we could hypothesize that our estimates are confounding the impact of the 
unemployment rate and that of a culture of marrying young. Adding these controls, we 
observe the same pattern of behavior of the GFR to changes in unemployment. To 
provide more convincing empirical evidence, we replicate our analysis distinguishing 
between children born within and outside of marriage. Since children increase the value 
of marriage (Stevenson 2007), and a job loss introduces instability (Doiron and 
Mendolia 2012), some couples may decide to have children to reinforce the marriage 
and make it more difficult to break. Then, we would expect a different response to the 
unemployment situation for a married couple than for a single mother. Results are in 
Columns (5) and (6). We use as dependent variable the number of live births within 
marriage per 1,000 married women, and the number of live births per thousand non-
married women. In the case of the fertility rate of the married women, we still see a 
clearly negative reaction of the fertility rate to variations in the unemployment rate. 
Nevertheless, although the impact of the unemployment rate is statistically significant 
and negative for those births out of marriage, the magnitude of the effect is considerable 
lower, in absolute value. Although it is comforting that our results are quite similar, 
these last estimates should be taken with caution, since we not only consider here those 
children of single women, but also those of less traditional family compositions 
(cohabitation, unmarried parenthood) that are becoming more common (Kiernan 2004). 
The impact of a job loss implies fewer available resources for a single mother than for a 
non-married couple. Then, that coefficient is difficult to interpret. For all this, we prefer 
to use as the dependent variable, in the rest of the analysis, the fertility rate for all 
women (married or not). Additionally, it is also common that, after pregnancy, non-
married couples decide to marry, the so-called ‘shot-gun’ marriages, which generates 
endogeneity concerns on the use of the marriage rate. Taking this into account, we have 
not incorporated all those controls in the rest of the analysis. 8 
Political, institutional, and economic differences at the country level may also 
affect our previous estimates. One can argue that fertility behavior may vary depending 
on whether the individuals live in a poor or rich country. In poor countries, the cost of 
bearing a child during economic crisis will be higher than in rich countries, for example 
because rich countries are more likely to have generous welfare systems that help the 
unemployed, or pregnant women. If this were the case, the response of the GFR to 
variations in the unemployment rate may differ, depending on the economic situation of 
the countries, rather than on variations in the business cycle. This can bias our estimates 
                                                 
8 We have repeated the analysis with all the controls considered in this work and results do not vary 
substantially. Note that the differences in the number of observations are due to problems of availability 
of information on those controls for several countries, see the notes for each table. We have also repeated 
the analysis by filling in the gaps in the controls by linear interpolation and results do not change. 
if the poorer countries are, for example, more likely to have higher unemployment rates. 
Then, it could be argued that the variation in the fertility rate is due to differences in the 
general macro-economic situation of the countries, rather than on business cycle 
fluctuations. In the case of Europe, this is not expected to be important, since, following 
the classification of the World Bank, all but two countries of our sample are classified 
as “high-income level countries”. The exceptions are Bulgaria and Romania, which are 
classified as “upper-middle income countries”. To show that this issue does not affect 
our findings, we repeat our analysis excluding those two countries (see Table 4, Column 
1). We can observe that, for our sample of high-income level countries, the estimated 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the GFR remains negative and 
statistically significant, and the magnitude of the impact barely changes.  
In the baseline results, we do not consider relevant political and institutional 
changes that occurred in some countries of our main sample. One of these changes is the 
process of independence obtained by six of the European countries considered in this 
work (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia) during the 
1990s (Source: The World Factbook of the CIA). If the uncertainty produced by those 
political and institutional changes had any effect on the reproductive behavior of 
women, our results could be biased. To face this issue, we exclude those countries and 
re-run the analysis, as in Column (2) of Table 4. Our results remain unchanged: the pro-
cyclical behavior of fertility appears to be quite robust to those subsample selections. 
Other political, institutional, and economic changes that occurred in the period 
considered are the process of incorporation to the European Union and the adoption of 
the Euro. As before, all these processes can generate uncertainties that could affect our 
estimates. To deal with this, we include a dummy variable that takes the value “1” from 
the year in which a country became a member of the European Union and the value “0” 
otherwise.9 We also introduce in our estimates a dummy variable that takes the value 
“1” from the year in which a country became a member of the European Union that uses 
the Euro and the value “0” otherwise.10 We report the estimates in Table 4, Columns (3) 
to (5). Again, the effect of unemployment rates on the GFR is negative and statistically 
significant.  
                                                 
9 Fifteen countries joined the European Union during the sample period: in 1995 (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden), in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia), and in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).  
10 Seventeen countries adopted the Euro during the sample period: in 1999 (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), in 2001 (Greece), in 
2007 (Slovenia), in 2008 (Cyprus and Malta), in 2009 (Slovakia), and in 2011 (Estonia).  
To reinforce the consistency of our results, we study whether our findings are 
affected by omitted economic and demographic variables. The impact of these variables 
correlated with the outcome of interest, if omitted, could be captured by the coefficients 
measuring the association between unemployment and fertility. We address this by 
including controls for several standard determinants of GFR, in Table 5. In Column (1), 
we first include the GDP per capita in logarithm. This control is calculated in US dollars 
at 2005 constant prices (data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators), and 
is used as a proxy for household income. It is arguable that not only the shock of job 
loss but also the impact of the evolution of the business cycle on household income, 
whether or not one individual is unemployed, may influence the fertility decision. 
Having a child can be more tempting for those individuals who can afford to maintain 
that child. Then, it follows that those who would endure greater economic constraints 
during an economic recession would be less likely to have a child. Results show a 
positive relationship between GDP per capita and fertility. The coefficient picking up 
the impact of unemployment does not change after the incorporation of the GDP in the 
specification. Our results show again a pro-cyclical behavior of fertility. In Column (2), 
we introduce the Infant Mortality Rate, since as suggested by Sah (1991), decreasing 
mortality rates lower the cost of having a surviving child, so it should have a positive 
impact on the GFR. On the other hand, the lower the mortality rate, the fewer children 
need to be replaced. After including this control, the effect of unemployment remains 
unchanged.  
Columns (3) and (4) include controls for education and immigration, respectively. 
As mentioned above, educational attainment and/or the level of education may be 
relevant in this analysis. Increasing the participation of individuals in education may 
affect fertility by increasing the opportunity cost of time, or by increasing the age at 
marriage, especially in the case of women (Barro and Becker 1988; Breierova and Duflo 
2004). But education can also be related to a possible job loss, since those individuals 
with a higher level of education are less likely to be unemployed (OECD 2012). Thus, 
our estimates may be picking up not only the effect of unemployment but also that of 
education. Although, to examine this issue, we would prefer to use as dependent 
variable the number of live births per women in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, unfortunately, this information is quite limited and so we cannot obtain 
reliable results. As before, we can only introduce controls, in this case, for the annual 
school gross enrolment ratios in primary, secondary and tertiary education by country.11 
After their inclusion, our conclusion on the relationship between unemployment and 
fertility does not change. Similarly, we would also prefer to include as dependent 
variable the number of live births per country of origin of women, but as in the case of 
education, this information is quite limited. The incorporation of the immigrant 
population to this analysis is relevant since their fertility behavior may be different from 
that of native-born women (Bellido et al. 2016; Kahn 1994) and there can also be 
differences in their response to an unemployment situation. With the limitation of the 
data, we can only address this issue by incorporating as control the annual percentage of 
immigrants over the total population in each country in Column (4) of Table 5. We find 
a positive impact of immigration on the GFR, but the pro-cyclical behavior of fertility is 
maintained.   
Cultural differences can also affect fertility decision, as Bellido et al. (2016) 
explain. Beliefs about fertility behavior may be passed on through religion (McQuillan 
2004). For example, the religious teachings on contraception and abortion may be 
important for the fertility behavior of women. The Roman Catholic Church, for 
example, opposes most forms of contraception and abortion (McQuillan 2004). Then, it 
can be surmised that those countries with a greater number of Catholics are more likely 
to behave differently in terms of fertility. It is more difficult to control pregnancy in a 
situation of unemployment for a woman who does not use any form of contraception, 
than for those using contraception. We explore this issue by examining the relationship 
between unemployment and fertility for a sample of Catholic countries. We utilize the 
observations of those countries whose population is recognized as Catholic in a 
percentage greater than 50%, with data from the CIA Factbook (Austria, Belgium, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain). Even with that subsample, the effect of the unemployment rate on the GFR 
remains negative and statistically significant, Column (5) of Table 5. 
As mentioned in our Introduction, the generosity of the welfare system in European 
countries can have an effect on the response of individuals to business cycle 
fluctuations. Public policies may account, at least to some extent, for fluctuations in 
fertility behavior (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009; Manuelli and Seshadri 2009). On the 
                                                 
11 The gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Source: United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics 
 
one hand, cash benefits received by unemployed individuals may mitigate the economic 
constraints of these individuals, making fertility more likely. To tackle this, we control 
for the annual cash benefits at the country level. Cash benefits are measured as public 
spending to compensate for unemployment, including redundancy payments from 
public funds, as well as the payment of pensions to beneficiaries before they reach the 
standard pensionable age, if these payments are made because the beneficiaries are out 
of work, or for other labor-market policy reasons (OECD dataset).12 Cash benefits are 
calculated as a percentage of GDP, column (1) in Table 6, and per head, in constant 
2005 US dollars, Column (2). Of course, a strong correlation exists between the 
unemployment rate and those measures of cash benefits, which can bias our estimates; 
however, even being aware of this problem, our results concerning the relationship 
between unemployment and fertility do not vary. On the other hand, European countries 
have public policies designed to encourage fertility by way of family allowances or 
paternity leave, which can affect the response of fertility to business cycle fluctuations. 
There are variations at the country level that we consider in Table 6, where we add 
several controls for such family policies.13 In Column (3), we control for the monthly 
family allowances received by the families for the first child. Columns (4) and (5) 
include the total number of weeks of maternity leave, and of parental leave, in each 
country. Column (6) includes the cash benefits during maternity leave, expressed as a 
percentage of female wages in manufacturing. Results suggest that the family policy 
with the greater effect on fertility is the total number of weeks of maternity leave, but 
cash benefits during maternity leave are also important. With respect to our variable of 
interest, the negative and significant effect of the unemployment rate on the GFR 
appears to be robust, regardless of the control introduced.  
In sum, our findings suggest a pro-cyclical behavior of fertility, at least in the short 
term: the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the GFR. This is maintained 
regardless of the country and year fixed effects included in the analysis, the country-
specific linear and quadratic time trends, as well as the introduction of a whole array of 
controls for potential determinants of fertility. The results are also unchanged when we 
                                                 
12 Observations are not available for the whole sample. For this reason, we repeated the analysis with only 
that sample, and our results are the same. 
13 The information on the controls used in this table comes from The Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. Gauthier. Due to data availability, we only include 17 countries here (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom). 
consider different sample selection. All of this reinforces the robustness and consistency 
of our findings. 
4.3. Lag specification 
Thus far, we have studied the contemporaneous effect of unemployment rates on 
fertility rates. However, as we previously explained, economic constraints and the 
uncertainty generated by job loss or by the economic crisis could lead couples to 
postpone their fertility decisions, simply because they cannot afford to have a child. In 
addition, fertility decisions normally take place several months before the birth, so it is 
possible to consider the lagged unemployment rate as an indicator of the economic 
conditions when couples actually considered having a child. It is worth noting that the 
potential concerns that the timing differences between business cycle variations and 
fertility decisions can generate, should be mitigated, in some way, since both the 
unemployment rate and the fertility rate can be considered as a lagged indicator of 
economic variations and a lagged proxy of fertility decisions, respectively. In any case, 
to explore this aspect, we include lagged unemployment rates in our analysis, which is a 
common strategy in this field of research (Ahn and Mira 2002; Kravdal 2002).  
The duration of the lag is not clear. For this reason, we follow the prior literature, 
examining the lagged impact of unemployment on several demographic variables and 
add lags of from 1 to 2 years (Amato and Beattie 2011; González-Val and Marcén 2015; 
Schaller 2013).  The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 7. Our results show an 
inverse relationship between the contemporaneous unemployment rate and the GFR, 
regardless of the measure of the unemployment rate used, Columns (1) to (3). The same 
is observed in the case of the unemployment rate lagged one period, although the 
magnitude of the effect is less than that observed in the case of the contemporaneous 
unemployment rate. This negative relationship can be explained by a postponement of 
fertility decisions. The unemployment rate lagged two periods does not appear to play a 
role, since the coefficient capturing the effect of this variable is not statistically 
significant. Even in these lagged specifications, fertility shows, once again, a pro-
cyclical behavior: the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the GFR.  
 
5. Quantile Regression 
In this section, we consider an alternative approach. All the previous conclusions are 
derived from an analysis of linear models; however, one could suggest that certain 
variables respond differently. In this case, part of the variation in the GFR may reflect 
the fact that the influence of certain country characteristics, particularly that of the 
unemployment rate, is not uniform across the distribution of this variable. It is possible 
to argue that a postponement of a fertility decision due to unemployment could be 
socially more acceptable in a country with low fertility rates, where individuals are less 
likely to have multiple children, than in a country with high fertility rates where women 
are expected to have several children. To explore this possible heterogeneous effect, we 
utilize quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett 1978). The quantile regression version 
of the linear model shown in Equation (1) is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itiititit TUnempGFR ζητφττβτα ++Π++= ' .  (2) 
where the estimated parameters are τ -dependent, with τ  being the corresponding 
quantile of the GFR. With this specification, we are able to analyze the impact of the 
unemployment rate on the entire distribution of the fertility rate and not merely its 
conditional mean. Quantile regressions take into account unobserved heterogeneity and 
allow for heteroskedasticity among the disturbances, non-normal errors, and are more 
robust to outliers than standard OLS regressions.14 
Figure 3 shows the quantile regression results for the Equation (2). The graph 
presents the estimated coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals for the 
unemployment rate across the nine quantiles considered (ranges from 0.1 to 0.9). It also 
shows the estimated effect using the linear model and its correspondent 95% confidence 
interval. We have included as controls country fixed effects, country-specific linear and 
quadratic time trends, and year fixed effects. Our estimates are weighted by country 
population. Regardless of the quantile considered, we find a negative and statistically 
significant effect of unemployment on fertility, although there appear to be differences 
since the higher the quantile, the greater the impact of unemployment on fertility, 
conditional on the level of unemployment. The reaction of the fertility rate to 
unemployment is twice as high (in absolute value) in the top quantile (0.9) than in the 
bottom quantile (0.1), pointing to unemployment as a more important factor 
determining fertility behavior for those countries with high fertility rates. As mentioned 
                                                 
14 Moreover, quantile regressions are invariant to monotonic transformations of the dependent variable, 
such as logarithms. 
previously, these results are conditional on the level of the unemployment rate, so it is 
possible to suggest that our estimations are being affected by the differences in 
unemployment rates at the country level. Those countries with relatively high 
unemployment rates could be driving the quantile regression estimation since they have 
low fertility rates. In order to test whether this is affecting our conclusions we have re-
run the analysis by considering only those countries having unemployment rates lower 
than 20% (excluding the observations of Bulgaria, Greece, and Spain) and also 
unemployment rates lower than 15% during the period considered (excluding Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
and Spain). The regression coefficients are plotted in Figure 4. As can be seen in that 
figure, the pattern of the response does not change. In all quantiles, there is a negative 
and statistically significant effect of unemployment on fertility but we also detect a 
higher negative effect of the unemployment rate in the top quantiles of the GFR than in 
the lower quantiles, as in the case of the whole sample.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationship between the business cycle and fertility behavior. 
We focus on the European case, since European countries present certain characteristics 
that can make the reaction of European individuals to the business cycle differ from 
those in other parts of the world. For instance, most European countries have quite 
generous welfare systems that can reduce the impact of economic downturns. Women 
living in those countries also tend to have their first child when older, which introduces 
difficulties with the postponement of fertility decisions as a reaction to an unexpected 
economic problem, because of the ‘ticking biological clock’. We use a sample of 30 
European countries, with data from 1991 to 2013, which covers a larger number of 
countries than has been considered in prior studies, and includes the most acute part of 
the last Great Recession. 
Following the existing literature on this issue, we use the unemployment rate to 
measure the business cycle, and the general fertility rate as an indicator of fertility. This 
allows us to examine the fertility response in the short term, but we cannot explore the 
impact on the completed fertility rate of women since, at this moment, their 
childbearing years have not yet ended. In any case, as suggested in the literature, a 
postponement of their fertility decisions in the short term may have a negative impact 
on their completed fertility. Our results suggest that the fertility rate shows a pro-
cyclical behavior, at least in the short term: the higher the unemployment rate, the lower 
the fertility rate. The magnitude of the effect appears to be moderate, which may be 
related to the low fertility rates of many of the countries in our sample. We should note 
that the response of the fertility rate of other countries, such as that of the US (a country 
with a less generous welfare system) is quite similar to that of Europe, see, for example, 
the recent work of Schneider (2015). 
Our findings are maintained even after including country and year fixed effects, and 
country-specific linear and quadratic time trends. It is also robust to the introduction of 
other country-level characteristics, such as per capita GDP, the infant mortality rate, 
education controls, the percentage of immigrants, different measures for the welfare 
system, and religion issues. Results are also unchanged when we use different sub-
samples, different measures of unemployment (including the male unemployment rate) 
and other measures of the fertility rate. Neither political changes nor the marital status 
of individuals drives our results. What is clearly observed is that the impact of the 
unemployment rate is lower (in absolute value) for older women. This behavior, as we 
suggest, may be related to the difficulties these women have in delaying their fertility 
decisions, or it could be due to the fact that older individuals are less likely to be 
affected by economic constraints, for instance, because their unemployment rate is 
lower than that of younger individuals during an economic recession. The lagged 
specification also reveals some expected results, since the job loss experienced by an 
individual may force them to postpone the fertility decision. We find that both the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate and the unemployment rate lagged one period 
negatively affect fertility decisions. 
We also make use of an alternative approach to examine the relationship between 
unemployment and fertility, using quantile regressions. To the best of our knowledge, 
this approach has not been used before in this literature. Even if our findings indicate 
that the higher the unemployment rates normally associated with an economic crisis, the 
lower the fertility rate, the effect of the unemployment rate may be different across the 
distribution of the fertility rate. By studying this possibly heterogeneous relationship, 
we still find an inverse relationship between unemployment and fertility. However, we 
also observe that this negative relationship is more pronounced at the top quantiles of 
the fertility rate, suggesting that, for those countries with low fertility rates, the business 
cycle is a less important factor in determining fertility decisions. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the GFR and Unemployment Rate in Europe (1991-2013) 
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Sources: Unemployment rate data come from the World Development Indicators (The World 
Bank; Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for 
and seeking employment). General Fertility Rates are calculated using data from Eurostat.  
 
Figure 2: Response of GFR by age of Women (15-44) 
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Notes: All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level with the exception of that 
capturing the effect of the overall unemployment on the fertility rate of women aged 25-29. The 
number of observations is 671. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are 
weighted by country population. Controls for country and year fixed effects as well as country-
specific linear and quadratic time trends are added to all those specifications. 
 
Figure 3: Response of GFR: Quantile Regression with the whole sample 
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Notes: Dependent variable: General Fertility Rate. The number of observations is 690. All 
regressions are weighted by country population. This graph plots the estimates on the impact of the 
unemployment rate on the general fertility rate obtained from an OLS specification, and from 
Quantile Regressions. Controls for country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific linear 
and quadratic trends are added to all those specifications. 
 
Figure 4: Response of GFR: Quantile Regression with different subsamples 
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Notes: Dependent variable: General Fertility rate. All regressions are weighted by country 
population. This graph plots the estimates on the impact of the unemployment rate on the general 
fertility rate obtained from Quantile Regressions. Controls for country and year fixed effects as 
well as country-specific linear and quadratic time trends are added to all those specifications. All 
coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The dashed line only incorporates 
the estimates for a sample of countries having an unemployment rate lower than 20% in the 
whole period. The number of observations is 621. Countries excluded are Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Spain. In the case of the solid line, the sample incorporates those countries having an 
unemployment rate lower than 15% in the whole period. The number of observations is 414. 
Countries excluded are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. 
 
Table 1.- Average GFR and Unemployment Rates by Country 
Country 
General Fertility 
Rate 
(1991-2013) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 (1991-2013) 
Spain 45.56 17.06 
Slovakia 48.67 14.08 
Bulgaria 45.92 13.37 
Poland 48.46 13.13 
Lithuania 48.29 12.83 
Latvia 45.27 12.6 
Greece 46.28 11.39 
France 61.77 10.02 
Finland 58.63 9.97 
Italy 46.07 9.62 
Ireland 66.58 9.44 
Estonia 49.45 9.23 
Hungary 47.19 8.74 
Germany 44.64 8.07 
Belgium 56.87 8.01 
Sweden 60.15 7.44 
Portugal 48.62 7.42 
Romania 47.84 7.13 
United Kingdom 59.94 6.97 
Malta 53.85 6.83 
Slovenia 45.5 6.81 
Denmark 60.11 6.17 
Czech Republic 47.51 6.16 
Cyprus 57.92 5.63 
Netherlands 56.94 4.7 
Austria 47.72 4.16 
Iceland 70.08 4.06 
Norway 63.25 4 
Switzerland 51.16 3.6 
Luxembourg 57.48 3.59 
Europe 52.92 8.41 
Sources: Unemployment rates data come from the World Development Indicators (The World 
Bank; Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for 
and seeking employment). General Fertility Rates are calculated using data from Eurostat.  
 
Table 2: General Fertility Rate Models: Baseline Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment Rate -0.534*** -0.382*** -0.346*** -0.008***   
 (0.147) (0.073) (0.101) (0.002)   
Male Unemployment Rate     -0.311***  
     (0.098)  
Female Unemployment Rate      -0.359*** 
      (0.099) 
Country fixed effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time N Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations 690 690 690 690 690 690 
R2 0.086 0.932 0.967 0.963 0.966 0.968 
Notes: Dependent variable: GFR in Columns (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6), and the GFR in logarithm 
in Column (4). Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by 
country population. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at 
the 10% level. 
  
 
 
Table 3: Fertility Rate Models: The importance of Marital Status 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment Rate -0.307** -0.333*** -0.383*** -0.377*** -0.241*** -0.065** 
 (0.116) (0.087) (0.101) (0.100) (0.064) (0.024) 
Crude Marriage Rate 1.602***      
 (0.540)      
Crude Divorce Rate  1.044     
  (0.651)     
Age at first marriage (Male)   -0.130    
   (0.452)    
Age at first marriage (Female)    -0.408   
    (0.489)   
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 680 652 595 595 574 574 
R2 0.970 0.967 0.963 0.963 0.979 0.996 
Notes: Dependent variable: General Fertility Rate in Columns (1) to (4), Total Live Births 
within marriage  divided by the total number of married women by country and year in Column 
(5), and the Total Live Births outside of marriage divided by the total number of nonmarried 
women by country and year in Column (6). The differences in the number of observations are 
due to the lack of information for the whole period. Not all observations are available for the 
dependent variable in the case of: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Romania, and United Kingdom in Column (5) and (6). Data come from Eurostat. There 
are not observations for the controls for the whole period in the cases of: Belgium, France, 
Iceland, Ireland, and United Kingdom, in Column (1); Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, and United Kingdom, in Column (2); Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia; Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom, in Column (3); Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia; Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, in Column (4). Data on the 
controls come from Eurostat. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are 
weighted by country population. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, 
*significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4.- General Fertility Rate Model Considering Political and Institutional Changes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment rate -0.373*** -0.365*** -0.338*** -0.346*** -0.341*** 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.100) (0.122) (0.120) 
EU member   2.304*  2.316* 
   (1.249)  (1.312) 
Adopted Euro    0.023 -0.147 
    (1.712) (1.829) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 644 552 690 690 690 
R2 0.970 0.972 0.968 0.967 0.968 
Notes: Dependent variable: GFR in all Columns. Robust standard errors clustered by country. All 
regressions are weighted by country population. Column (1) does not include the observations of 
the upper-middle-income economies (Bulgaria and Romania) following the classification of 
the World Bank. In Column (2), the observations from the countries that obtained 
independence from another country (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia) are excluded from the sample. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 
5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5.- General Fertility Rate Model Considering Country- Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment rate -0.248***
-
0.349*** -0.247*** -0.335*** -0.257*** 
 (0.087) (0.101) (0.061) (0.113) (0.060) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 15.332**     
 (7.454)     
Infant Mortality Rate  -0.430    
  (0.494)    
Gross Enrolment ratio Primary   -0.027   
   (0.041)   
Gross Enrolment ratio Secondary   -0.033   
   (0.023)   
Gross Enrolment ratio Tertiary   0.118**   
   (0.047)   
% Immigrants    1.874***  
    (0.659)  
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 663 689 635 556 276 
R2 0.970 0.967 0.976 0.975 0.974 
Notes: Dependent variable: GFR in all Columns. Controls included are GDP per capita in 
logarithm in Column (1) (some observations are not available for the case of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia); Infant Mortality Rate in Column (2) (there is no information 
for the case of France in the year 2013); the school gross enrolment ratio in primary, secondary 
and tertiary education in Column (3) (there are no data for the whole sample in the case of: 
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania Slovakia, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom); the percentage of immigrants in Column (4) (there are no data for the whole sample 
in the case of: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Switzerland). Column 5 only includes the observations of those countries whose population is 
recognized as Catholic, in a percentage greater than 50%, using data from the CIA Factbook 
(those countries are Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain)  Robust standard errors clustered by country. All 
regressions are weighted by country population. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at 
the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6.- General Fertility Rate Model Controlling for Public Policies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment rate -0.329** -0.326** -0.356*** -0.481*** -0.494*** -0.498*** 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.083) (0.056) (0.071) (0.053) 
Cash Benefits as % GDP -0.008      
 (0.830)      
Cash Benefits per capita  -0.0004     
  (0.003)     
Monthly family allowance   0.014    
for the first child   (0.013)    
Total number of weeks of    0.281***   
maternity leave    (0.044)   
Total number of weeks of      -0.026  
Parental leave     (0.023)  
Cash benefits during      0.022* 
Maternity leave      (0.012) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 486 486 306 339 339 339 
R2 0.978 0.978 0.985 0.986 0.985 0.985 
Notes: Dependent variable: GFR in all Columns. Cash benefits are measured as public 
unemployment spending to compensate for unemployment. This factor includes redundancy 
payments from public funds, as well as the payment of pensions to beneficiaries before they 
reach the standard pensionable age, if these payments are made because the beneficiaries are out 
of work, or for other labor/market policy reasons (OECD dataset).  Cash benefits are calculated 
as a percentage of GDP (column (1)) and per capita, in constant 2005 US dollars (columns (2)). 
This information is only available until 2011, and it is available for 24 countries. With respect to 
the Monthly family allowances for the first child, included in Column (3) as a control, the 
information is only available until 2008 for 17 countries. In the case of the Total number of 
weeks of maternity leave, and of parental leave included in Columns (4) and (5), as well as in 
the case of the Cash benefits during maternity leave, expressed as a percentage of female wages 
in manufacturing added in Column (6), the information is available until 2010 for 17 countries. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions are weighted by country 
population. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
Table 7.- General Fertility Rate Model: Including Lags for Unemployment 
Model: OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Unemployment rate -0.204**   
 (0.087)   
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.155**   
 (0.062)   
Unemployment rate t-2 -0.036   
 (0.138)   
Male Unemployment rate  -0.182**  
  (0.077)  
Male Unemployment rate t-1  -0.125**  
  (0.056)  
Male Unemployment rate t-2  -0.071  
  (0.154)  
Female Unemployment rate   -0.229*** 
   (0.080) 
Female Unemployment rate t-1   -0.161** 
   (0.074) 
Female Unemployment rate t-2   -0.003 
   (0.093) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y 
Country x Time Y Y Y 
Country x Time2 Y Y Y 
R2 630 630 630 
Observations 0.970 0.970 0.971 
Notes: Dependent variable: GFR in all Columns. Robust standard errors clustered by country. 
All regressions are weighted by country population. ***Significant at the 1% level, 
**significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
